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Purposeful Reforms in Criminal Law
Judge Lee E. Skeel*
W HAT IS THE RELATION of the Office of the County Prose-
cutor or District Attorney to the job of public law en-
forcement?
It is true that the county prosecutor's office has much to do
with the civil practice of the law as the legal representative of
the county Government, including public boards and commis-
sions. Undoubtedly this part of the duty of many prosecutors,
particularly in the larger counties, in some respects transcends
in importance the other work of this office. There is, however, no
universal basis on which such a comparison can be made. Yet,
may it ever be remembered, the proper enforcement of the pub-
lic or criminal law is a matter of great importance to every resi-
dent of the community. It is important not only to protect the
safety of the community from unlawful disturbances and aggres-
sions against the peace and quiet of the people, but also to see to
it, insofar as is humanly possible, that the rigor of the law will
be exerted only against the guilty, and that even in that event
that it is limited to the extent necessary in order to protect the
innocent. There is no place in human relations where there is
greater divergence of opinion on, first, the purpose of law en-
forcement of the criminal law,' and second, on how and why the
guilty should be punished.2 The historical background, however,
* Of the Ohio Court of Appeals; President of Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; etc.
[Editors' Note: This is the substance of an address recently delivered to
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Ohio.]
1 "For the most part the purpose of the criminal law is only to induce
external conformity to rule. All law is directed to conditions of things
manifest to the senses. And whether it brings those conditions to pass
immediately by the use of force, as when it protects a house from a mob by
soldiers, or appropriates private property to public use, or hangs a man in
pursuance of a judicial sentence, or whether it brings them about mediately
through men's fears, its object is equally an external result. In directing
itself against robbery or murder, for instance, its purpose is to put a stop
to the actual physical taking and keeping of other men's goods, or the
actual poisoning, shooting, stabbing, and otherwise putting to death of
other men. If those things are not done, the law forbidding them is
equally satisfied, whatever the motive." Holmes, The Common Law, 49
(1881).
2 Theories in justification of punishment brought forward by ethicists may
be described as: (1) Retributive Theory, whereby through punishment
(Continued on next page)
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leaves no doubt but that suffering imposed as punishment for
causing injury to the person of another originally was founded
on the idea of vengeance.3
It would serve no useful purpose here to deal at length with
the laborious evolution of the blood feud of the 10th Century into
the criminal prosecution now conducted in the name of the state.
These historical facts are known and understood by every law-
yer. What today is in dispute is just how to find a purposeful
explanation for, and just what is to be accomplished by, the im-
position of penalties upon those who have been found guilty of
what has been defined as criminal conduct.
As to what constitutes a public wrong punishable at the in-
stance of the state, we as lawyers look with pride and satisfaction
to the development of the common law.4 No civilization has ever
created, in its development, a system of law which so clearly ad-
ministers justice according to rules founded on experience, and
which is administered so precisely by courts in judicial proceed-
ings. Not very much has been decided at any one time.5 Each
(Continued from preceding page)
the offender expiates his offense, suffers retribution for the evil which has
been done, and thus is vindicated the principle of justice which has been
violated. (2) Deterrent Theory, according to which punishments are in-
flicted in order that other would-be law breakers may be dissuaded from
crime. (3) Preventative Theory, the aim of which is to prevent the repeti-
tion of the offense by the surveillance, imprisonment, or execution of the
criminal. (4) Reformation Theory, the object of which is the moral reforma-
tion of the delinquent. Willoughby, W. W., Social Justice, 322-380 (1900).
3 Some writers frankly recognize that the criminal law had its origin in a
situation in which vengeance and material reimbursement were of prime
importance and that one of the major purposes of criminal law is still to
satisfy these elemental human emotions. cf., Stephen, General View of the
Criminal Law of England, 99 (1883).
4 In large part the criminal law of the United States has been inherited
from the common law of England. The common law is universal in its ap-
plication to all human relations and to all of the interests of society. The
common law, in the sense in which it is here used, is a body of law which
derives its authority, not from express enactment of the legislative power
like the statute law, but from the fact that it has existed and been accepted
as the law from time immemorial. It is preserved and evidenced by
judgments of the courts applying it to particular cases as they arise.
Holmes, The Common Law, C. 2 (1881).
5 "It is not till a very late stage in its history that law is regarded as a
series of commands issued by the sovereign power of the state. Indeed,
even in our own time and country that conception of it is gaining ground
very slowly. An earlier, and to some extent a still prevailing view of it is
more like an art or science, the principles of which are at first vaguely
enunciated and are gradually reduced to precision by their application to
particular circumstances. Somehow, no one can say precisely how, though
more or less plausible and instructive conjectures upon the subject may be
(Continued on next page)
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forward step has been guided by our experience in the trial of
actual disputes. Justice under law, guided by the will of free
people who accept the rules developed as a true expression of
what is just-that is our heritage, rightly described as liberty un-
der law.
But what we do about those who carry non-conformity to the
extent of violating public law is another matter. Until we reach
common agreement as to the purposes of punishment6 imposed
for criminal conduct, and as to what is thereby to be accom-
plished, this part of our criminal procedure must be held to be
"unfinished business."
What ultimately results from the efforts of prosecutors (and
defense counsel) in criminal cases is a matter of the utmost pub-
lic importance. If the punishment prescribed in a criminal case
has the effect only of taking the offender out of circulation for the
period of imprisonment, whereupon he is returned as a seasoned
criminal, then not only has the first effort in protecting society
failed, but greater dangers have been created. These problems
cannot be solved except by law. To this solution every lawyer
must contribute his part. The medical profession also may be
able to contribute to the methods best to be used, but the law
must ultimately be the guide to, and make final provision for, the
final solution of this pressing problem.
In one of the casebooks on criminal law,7 Walter Lippmann's
celebrated editorial is reprinted from a New York newspaper. It
discussed in a very critical way the case of "The Bobbed Haired
Bandit." 8 Her exploits before capture created a "movie-like"
(Continued from preceding page)
made, certain principles come to be accepted as the law of the land." Sir
James Stephen, Stephen's Criminal Law, Introduction, viii (1883).
6 Punishment has no purpose except as it works out a larger purpose of
the criminal law itself. Perhaps it may be said that whatever purpose is
served by punishment is a purpose of criminal law, for example, the com-
pelling of persons to cease or refrain from committing crime, by forcing
or persuading them to conform to established rules of conduct designed
for the protection of life, of government, of property or of other rights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed by law. Miller, J., Handbook of
Criminal Law, 18 (1934).
7 Sayre, F. B., A Selection of Cases on Criminal Law (1930).
8 Lippmann, in this dramatic editorial, gave the sordid and pathetic back-
ground of the life of Cecilia Cooney, the bobbed-haired bandit. After
describing the failures of every social and governmental agency to success-
fully cope with the problems presented by Cecilia Cooney, he concluded
that the crimes attributed to her were not hers alone, but also rested upon
the heads of society in general. Lippmann, W., Editorial in the New York
World, May 8, 1924.
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sensation. Once she was in jail, however, stripped of all the
glamour created by newswriters' imaginations ("manufactured
sensationalism"), the case demonstrated the almost complete fail-
ure of every agency, governmental and social, that had come in
contact with her from the time of her first acts of delinquency to
the date of her final acts as a "sensational girl bandit." The mis-
take of imprisonment was the final act wherein she probably now
languishes, forgotten and alone.
Lippmann's editorial was followed by a philosophical discus-
sion by Willoughby 9 on the reasons for punishment inflicted upon
violators of the criminal law by the state. Here, in great detail,
the writer suggested that the public generally is concerned in
seeking public vengeance. This purpose, he said, if consistently
applied to guilty offenders, should not only satisfy the public
desire to avenge the wrong done, but also deter others from en-
gaging in like conduct.
However, it is evident that while present-day methods are
ill-suited to the real purpose of punishment, administrators of
modern penal institutions, and courts and probation departments
dealing with law violators who are granted probation, consider
their efforts to be aimed chiefly at attempts to reform or educate
the prisoner to the use of proper conduct as a member of society.
This must, in fact, be the real purpose of all proceedings in a
criminal case. If in fact deterrence of others is accomplished,
which is probably true of borderline cases, the public is bene-
ficially affected. But purposely to punish one person merely
as an example to others can have no legal foundation. It must,
therefore, be hoped that where thought is given to the subject,
the theory of reformation will, as far as possible, replace the
demand for vengeance as the public purpose of imposition of
penalties for crime. The point to be brought out here, however,
in resolving this conflict of purpose, is that if any agency of gov-
ernment is to protect society in a permanent fashion, from dam-
age inflicted by violations of criminal law, then if at all possible,
that agency should be the one best informed and suited to give
help in the solution of what to do after a judgment of guilty. That
agency is the one which is experienced in dealing with criminal
prosecutions.
The prosecutor himself should lead the way. Nowhere are
there any with better understanding of the problem, in direct
9 Willoughby, W. W., supra, note 2.
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contact with all necessary factual information, and possessing a
staff capable of rendering so great a public service in defending
society against crime-by seeing to it that conviction is only the
first step in guarding society against depredation caused by the
criminal-minded. It is my belief that the prosecutors of Ohio
should join hands with the many public and private agencies
and institutions that are trying to deal with this question and
that are so desperately in need of help.
Quite apart from this suggestion is another in which the
force of the great office of the county prosecutor should, in my
opinion, give help in protecting society against injuries caused
to the public safety by criminal law violators. That help should
be in the legislative field. Ohio is a state which, for better or for
worse, has, in defining the substantive law of criminal conduct,
abandoned the common law to the extent at least that it is
authoritatively held that there are "no common law crimes in
Ohio." 10 That is to say that while most if not all common law
crimes are, at least in name, included in our criminal code, yet
unless a common law crime is so defined (that is, conduct pro-
hibited by statute, and a penalty provided), there can be no
prosecution therefor in this state. This statement, although in a
sense academic, is the background of seeking active interest in
supporting needed legislation to include fundamental common
law rules that have stood the test of time in common acceptance
in all jurisdictions ruled by the common law, and to modernize
obsolete rules where necessary, as has been done in many other
jurisdictions. I will refer only to two crimes among many others
which need legislative help. They are murder in the first and
second degree as defined by Sections 2901.01 and 2901.05 of the
Revised Code," and larceny and related crimes against property.
10 In Ohio, we have no common law offenses. No act, however atrocious,
can be punished criminally, except in pursuance of a statute or ordinance
lawfully enacted. Mitchell v. State, 42 0. S. 383 (1884).
11 Section 2901.01 Ohio Revised Code now provides in part: "No person
shall purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated malice, or by
means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate rape, arson,
robbery or burglary, kill another." The words "purposely, and either of
deliberate and premeditated malice" are held to apply in killings by any
of the means named thereafter, since these words appear to be directed to
the described crimes.
Section 2901.05, Ohio Revised Code, the crime of murder in the second
degree is defined as "purposely and maliciously" killing another. The dif-
ference between murder in the second degree and murder in the first de-
gree, is that in the crime of murder in the first degree, such purposeful
killing must be of deliberate or premeditated malice or in the use of poison
or in the perpetration of rape, arson, robbery or burglary or in the killing
of a police officer purposefully while in the discharge of his duty. Thirteenth
Report of The Judicial Council of Ohio, pp. 24, 25 (1957).
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A complete report and the proposed amendments will be found
in the Thirteenth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of
Ohio.12
There is, of course, but one degree of unlawful homicide at
common law, which is defined as the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought. As defined in the common law
states, in England, and by the recognized authorities, malice
aforethought "exists where the person doing the act which
causes death has an intention to cause death or grievous bodily
harm to some person, although he does not desire it, or even
wishes it may not cause death." 13 It is to be noticed that a
specific purpose to kill is not a necessary element of unlawful
homicide at common law.1 4 Under the Ohio statutes, above cited,
one cannot be held guilty of first or second degree murder unless
the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ant entertained a specific purpose to kill at the time he caused
the death of his unfortunate victim. This is true even if the de-
fendant is attempting to commit or is committing robbery, arson,
12 Proposed Amendment to Section 2901.01 0. R. C.: "No person shall
purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means
of poison kill another, and no person shall, without purpose to kill another
while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate rape, arson, armed robbery,
robbery, or burglary, kill another."
In this suggested amendment "purpose to kill" is retained as one of
the elements of the crime of murder in the first degree except that where
death is the direct and proximate result of perpetrating or attempting to
perpetrate the four dangerous and heinous felonies of rape, arson, armed
robbery, and burglary.
Proposed Amendment to Section 2901.05, Ohio Revised Code: "No
person shall with malice aforethought kill another." This proposed amend-
ment eliminates "purposely and maliciously" and substitutes "with malice
aforethought." Murder in the second degree will include the causing of
death in resisting lawful arrest, causing death by the commission of an
act which would in all reasonable probability cause such death, and death
resulting from the purposeful attempt to cause great bodily harm. Thir-
teenth Report of the Judicial Council of Ohio, pp. 24, 25, 55 (1957).
13 Black's Law Dictionary, 1110 (4th ed., 1951).
14 As early as 1536 it was held that if a person was killed accidentally by
one of the members of a band engaged in a felonious act, all could be
found guilty of murder. Mansell & Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128 b (1536).
Coke's statement went further, declaring that death resulting from any
unlawful act was murder. 6 Hobbes, English Works, Dialogue of the Com-
mon Laws, pp. 86, 87 (Molesworth Ed. 1840). But it is from Blackstone's
statement of the rule that the felony murder doctrine has become most
widely known: "When an involuntary killing happens in consequence of
an unlawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according to
the nature of the act which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a
felonious intent or in its consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it
will be murder; but if no more was intended than a mere civil trespass, it
will only amount to manslaughter." 4 Blackstone Commentaries, 192, 193
(1897).
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burglary or rape. I cite the Turk case, which has never been
overruled.15 There the defendant set fire to his store in order to
collect insurance. The store was on the first floor, while at the
time there were over thirty people asleep on the second and
third floors of the building, many of whom died as a result of
the defendant's unlawful act. These facts, without question,
would have made out a case of murder at common law.1 It was
held to be manslaughter, by the Ohio Courts. The same principle
was held to be controlling in the Freeman case,17 where the de-
fendant claimed that the killing of an officer was accidental in
resisting lawful arrest.
The amendment proposed provides that a purpose to kill be
retained, and that it must be shown in most cases; yet that it
need not be shown when death is caused while perpetrating or
attempting to perpetrate one of the four dangerous felonies.'
8 , 19
15 Turk v. State, 48 Oh. App. 489, affd. 129 0. S. 245, 194 N. E. 453 (1935).
"It was the common law rule that any act known to be dangerous to life,
and likely in itself to cause death, done with the purpose of committing
a felony, which caused death was murder. This is not the law of the
state of Ohio. The statute is clear and explicit, and the provision is 'who-
ever, purposely . . . kills.' In other words, there must be a purpose and
intent to kill before the crime of murder is complete."
16 Under the amendment proposed by the Judicial Council of Ohio these
facts would also make out a case of murder. Note 12, supra. Under a
statute similarly worded (except that felony murder in Wisconsin is third
degree murder) a Wisconsin court refused to consider the felony murder
rule in connection with the death of a family in a fire alleged to have
been caused by defendant while attempting rape declaring that "the felony
committed must have some intimate and close relation with the killing
and must not be separate, distinct, and independent from it." Pliemling
v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. W. 278 (1879).
17 Freeman v. State, 119 0. S. 250, 163 N. E. 202 (1928). "If the killing was
unintentional and not 'purposely or wilfully' done, if the trigger was pulled
by Officer Horn without any causal intention on the part of the defendant,
it would not have been murder in the first degree." Under the proposed
amendment of Section 2901.05, Ohio R. C., murder in the second degree
would include the causing of death in resisting of lawful arrest. See note
12, supra.
18 Most American jurisdictions reserve their severest punishments for
killings perpetrated in the commission of certain specified felonies, leaving
those perpetrated in the course of lesser felonies to fall under the designa-
tion of murder in the second or third degree or manslaughter. Usually the
felonies of arson, rape, robbery, and burglary are specified. Several states
add mayhem to this list. Maryland, New Jersey and North Dakota add
sodomy, Pennsylvania adds kidnapping, and Arkansas, Tennessee, and
Washington add larceny. Note, 20 Cornell L. Q., 294 (1934-35).
19 In New York, a statute makes the killing of a human being by a person
engaged in the commission of or in an attempt to commit, any felony the
crime of murder in the first degree. In People v. La Marca, the Court of
Appeals in affirming a judgment of the County court of Nassau upon a
(Continued on next page,
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The amendment also defines second degree murder, except as
otherwise provided in defining first degree murder, to be the un-
lawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. If
penalties are to mean anything, the above suggested changes
are justified on the record.
The highly technical elements of the several crimes involving
the taking of the personal property of another have caused no
end of confusion in the cases. Larceny, larceny by trick, em-
bezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses, and conversion
by a bailee, have presented troublesome technical questions for
many years. It is proposed to consolidate all crimes of this charac-
ter under one statute.2 0 This purpose has been accomplished
in a number of states, including New York, Massachusetts, and
California. In the New York Law Journal of May, 1942, the new
larceny law was discussed by Judge Fuld, as reported in the
Judicial Council's Report, as follows: 21
(Continued from preceding page)
verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of kidnapping and murder in
the first degree of the infant Peter Weinberger, said: "Unlike certain
other jurisdictions which reserve their severest punishments for killing
perpetrated in the commission of certain specified felonies, our state,
through the legislature has decreed that a homicide constitutes felony
murder, punishable by death, if it be perpetrated 'by a person engaged in
the commission of or in an attempt to commit a felony.'"
"One necessary qualification has been engrafted onto our felony murder
rule and that is that the underlying felony must be independent of the
homicide; for otherwise every homicide, not justifiable or excusable, would
occur in the commission of a felony-namely the assault which ended in
death-with the result that premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill
would never have to be established to convict an accused of murder in
the first degree." People v. La Marca, 165 N. Y. S. 2d 753, 3 N. Y. 2d 452
(1957).
20 In Ohio, larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property by false pre-
tenses, are different offenses. Larceny takes many forms and numerous
statutes have been enacted, each of which directs the punishment of the
larceny of a particular item, or committed in a particular way. The follow-
ing list is an example of such special larceny statutes: Larceny by trick
(§ 2907,21 R. C.); Horse stealing or concealing stolen horse (§ 2907.22 R. C.);
pocket picking (§ 2907.29); stealing or destroying a will (§ 2907.32 R. C.);
embezzlement (§ 2907.34 R. C.); embezzlement of school books (§ 2907.38
R. C.); etc.
The Judicial Council in the Twelfth Report proposed that the statutes
be consolidated and that the distinction between larceny, false pretense,
conversion and embezzlement be eliminated so that prosecutions of each
of these offenses may be had under a single statute. This is not a new idea
in the prosecution of larceny cases. Other states have been forced to enact
similar statutes because of the complications which arise in the identification
of the offense committed. The boundaries between the crimes of larceny,
embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses has always been
difficult to define. Thirteenth Report of Judicial Council of Ohio, pp. 23, 24
(1957).
21 107 N. Y. L. J., 2124 (May 19, 1942).
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"After stating that the new law did not broaden the scope
of the crime of larceny nor designate as criminal that which
had formerly been innocent and not criminal, Judge Fuld
went on to relate that in the past in New York (the same
is now generally true in Ohio), larceny, embezzlement and
obtaining property by false pretenses each had to be prose-
cuted by a different indictment (or by separate counts of the
same indictment) and '* * * a vast amount of confusion ac-
companied the attempt to preserve the identity of each of
these crimes.'
"As a result of having these distinctions engrafted upon
the law, the persons who concededly stole property were
able to escape conviction merely because the theory of the
prosecution proved erroneous when considered upon appeal."
At the close of his article, Judge Fuld went on to say:
"The Legislature has left no doubt as to its purpose mi
passing the new statute, and the language employed is suf-
ficiently clear and explicit to require its application in the
manner intended. The Act assures full protection to a de-
fendant charged with theft, and yet-as was said in a Colum-
bia Law Review note22 pertaining to a Massachusetts larceny
statute, 'It does away with wasting the time of the court in
deciding subtleties of law, which, far from being of any prac-
tical law use, are a positive impediment to justice.'"
"In short, if construed in accordance with the intention
of the law's proponents, new Section 1290 of the Penal Law
will unquestionably promote the administration of criminal
justice in this state."
These two amendments, which have been presented to the
legislature by the Judicial Council, with others of equal impor-
tance, have received little consideration at their hands in its last
two sessions. I am confident that the Ohio prosecutors can, with
good conscience, bring about successful consideration of these and
many other needed changes in the Criminal Law of Ohio, so
that our Criminal Code will be equal to that of any other state
in protecting the rights of the people as well as of those charged
with crime.
22 20 Columbia L. R. 318 (1920).
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